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a b s t r a c t
Progress in computer forensics research has been limited by the lack of a standardized data
setsdcorporadthat are available for research purposes. We explain why corpora are
needed to further forensic research, present a taxonomy for describing corpora, and
announce the availability of several forensic data sets.
ª 2009 Digital Forensic Research Workshop. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Much of the work to date in digital forensics has focused on
data extraction and for presentation in courts. Researchers
have developed technologies for copying data from subject
hard drives, storing that data in a disk image file, searching
the disk image for document files, and presenting the docu-
ments to an examiner.
As both the variety and scale of forensic investigations
increase, forensic practitioners need tools that do more than
search and present: they need tools for reconstruction, anal-
ysis, clustering, data mining, and sense-making. Such tools
frequently require the development of new scientific tech-
niques in areas such as text mining, machine learning, visu-
alization, and related fields.
One of the hallmarks of science is the ability for researchers
to perform controlled and repeatable experiments that produce
reproducible results. Science is based on the principle that
phenomena can be observed and results can be reproduced by
anyonedthere are no privileged experimenters or observers
(given sufficient training and financial resources, of course).
Sadly, much of today’s digital forensic research results are
not reproducible. For example, techniques developed and
tested by one set of researchers cannot be validated by others
since the different research groups use different data sets to
test and evaluate their techniques.
1.1. Why forensic corpora are needed
Having a reference set of representative corpora enhances the
scientific evaluation of forensic methods beyond the obvious
benefits of providing ready test data and enabling direct
comparison of different approaches. Namely, it allows for the
ground truth to be established using manual or otherwise
time-consuming methods. Such results can then be used as
a baseline to evaluate the success of new tools and methods
using objective metrics.
In the digital forensics field there have been sporadic
efforts to produce standardized corpora, mostly in the form of
forensic challenges. The main goal of these challenges has
been the development of practical tools for problem areas in
need. Since 2005, DFRWS has issued an annual challenge
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focused on specific topics: Windows memory analysis, Linux
memory analysis, and data carving. The DoD Cyber Crime
Center (DC3) has also been issuing annual challenges, which
have had a broader scope, including data recovery from
damaged hardware and media.
These challenges have spurred research and development
in the focus areas and have brought excitement and tangible
results to the field. Yet the scope of these challenges is much
too limited to support digital forensics research and tool
validation on a larger scale. In particular, it would be difficult
to argue that a particular method has undergone rigorous
evaluation just because it is able to solve a specific challenge.
Today the results from mainstream commercial tools are
frequently accepted based solely on the reputation of the
vendor, which in turn is frequently based solely upon name
recognition. Although anyone can perform an independent
evaluation of today’s tools, such work is challenging without
the availability of test data that can be readily shared.
Looking forward, the deluge of data that must be analyzed
will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. This will
likely necessitate the development of statistical and other
approximation techniques. It is imperative that we have
a large, representative sample of data that has been processed
with exact techniques and well-characterized so that we can
have confidence in these approximations. This ultimately
benefits society as a whole, given the increasing importance of
digital evidence in legal proceedings: by ensuring that the
interpretation of digital evidence is grounded in facts and
solid science and not simply upon opinion.
Another benefit of reference corpora is that they can
become of the focus of investment for the entire community.
By becoming community property, reference sets enables
more efficient use of limited research resources. Such sets
also give funding agencies a framework for advancing the field
as a whole, whether through constructed ‘‘challenges’’ or by
using the corpora to help establish and quantify milestones
and reference capabilities.
From a training and educational perspective, it is difficult
to overstate the need for realistic data sets. Anyone who has
been on the instructors side of the process will testify to the
huge investment of time that goes into creating realistic
forensic scenarios. Much of this work is not shared broadly
and that is clearly inefficient and wasteful in a relatively small
field with limited budgets. The creation of common corpora
can start and stimulate the process of accumulating and
sharing such data.
1.2. Contributions and paper outline
With this paper we present justification for the creation of
large-scale standardized forensic corpora (Section 2), and
introduce a taxonomy for understanding the corpora that
have been created to date (Section 3). We announce the
availability of four corpora for research and educational
purposes (Section 4). We share lessons learned (Section 5).
Finally we present related work (Section 6) and conclude.
2. Forensic reproducibility
Despite the importance of reproducibility for the scientific
process, there have been few attempts to enable digital
forensics researchers to produce reproducible results. We
suggest that this lack of attention to reproducibility is a result
of the manner in which digital forensics has evolved and the
nature of forensics data.
2.1. Reproducibility in science
In recent years the popular media has portrayed reproduc-
ibility as the primary means by which scientists validate each
other’s results and combat scientific fraud. While these are
important benefits, reproducibility has a far more mundane
though important role in day-to-day lives of scientists.
Fundamentally, the reproducibility of scientific results
makes it possible for groups of scientists to build upon the
results of others. This is especially true in experimental
sciences, where observations can frequently outstrip the
ability of theory to explain them. Reproducibility makes it
possible for one researcher or research group to validate that
they have mastered a technique and then to go off in
a different direction. In biology, reproducibility is so important
that researchers will routinely trade cell lines and DNA
samples, and even apprentice in each others’ labs, so that
techniques and knowledge can be diffused throughout the
field.
Reproducibility also has an important role in the develop-
ment, sale and use of scientific instrumentation. Reproduc-
ibility allows equipment from different vendors to be
calibrated against objective measures. Here the need for
reproducibility goes hand-in-hand with the commercial
availability of scientific standardsdfor example, weights of
known mass, solutions of known concentration, and sealed
glass vials of known composition.
Reproducibility has a critical role in education as well.
Students learn and validate their mastery of scientific tech-
niques by performing experiments with known outcomes.
Without reproducibility there can be no objective evaluation
of student work.
Table 1 – Size of the US and Non-US drive corpus.
Corpus HDs Flash CDs GBa
US Corpus 1258 2939 GB
Non-US Corpus:
BA 7 38 GB
CA 46 1 420 GB
CN 26 568 98 999 GB
DE 37 1 765 GB
GR 10 6 GB
IL 152 4 964 GB
IN 66 29 GB
MX 156 571 GB
NZ 1 4 GB
TH 1 3 13 GB
Total Non-US: 1056 643 98 3723 GB
a Uncompressed.
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2.2. Reproducibility and forensic practice
Digital forensics has evolved over the past two decades to
solve the real-world needs of criminal investigators. As dis-
cussed above, much emphasis, until now, has been on evidence
preservation and data presentation. The legal standard that
forensic tools must pass in order to be usable in this context is
the Best Evidence Rule, and specifically Rule 1001(3) of the US
Federal Rules of Evidence, which holds that the information
shown to the Court (or used as the basis for testimony by an
expert) must ‘‘reflect data accurately (Federal rules of
evidence, 2008)’’.
This requirement for ‘‘accuracy’’, together with traditional
forensic notions of evidence preservation, is largely respon-
sible for the forensic community’s standardization on cryp-
tographic hash functions (e.g. SHA1) to detect possible
alternations in the evidence. It is also responsible for the
practice of reporting ‘‘the precise address (physical cluster,
sector offset, etc.)’’ of data recovered from slack space on
a disk when making a forensic report to a court or opposing
counsel (Patzakis, 2001).
This ‘‘accuracy’’ standard is surprisingly low: for most
purposes it is sufficient to show that a tool does not alter
evidence and that it faithfully reports the precise addresses in
order to certify the tool for use in a court room. Likewise, it is
assumed that experts working for the defense would be given
an ‘‘accurate’’ copy of the prosecution’s evidence so that the
scientific conclusions of the forensic analysis could be repli-
cated. But the forensic community has been exceedingly slow
to adopt performance requirements and standards for
forensic software. For example, the NIST Computer Forensic
Tool Testing Program did not create a draft ‘‘Forensic String
Searching Tool Requirements Specification’’ until January
2008 (Computer Forensic Tool Testing Program, 2008), and the
final version of this specification has yet to be adopted.
2.3. Reproducibility and forensics research
Establishing reproducibility of research findings is consider-
ably more difficult than establishing the reproducibility of
a forensic investigation in a specific criminal or civil case.
Forensic tools and techniques, by their very nature, are
operate on data sets that are large, generated by people, and
are intensely personal. This leads to several practical and legal
problems:
 Because the data sets are generated by people, their use by
any research that is funded by the US Government or takes
place within most universities is governed by the HHS
Common Rule (45 CFR 46), Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs), Research Ethics Committees, or some other form of
institutional oversight.1 By design, such oversight creates
additional administrative barriers which must be satisfied
prior to the use of human subject data.
 Rather than go to the problem of collecting data from
research subjects and working within the formalized insti-
tutional oversight process, many researchers simply use
their own data (network packets, disk images, etc.) in their
experiments.2 This data lacks the diversity and unpredict-
ability of real data, compromising the research findings.
 Because research data typically contains personal or
proprietary information, experimenters are typically not
willing to share their experimental data with others.
Because the data is not shared, there is no way for other
experimenters to replicate the results.
 Experimenters who do work through the IRB process
necessarily face procedural hurdles and administrative
delays when they seek to share their data sets with
othersdespecially when partnering with researchers at
organizations that do not have IRBs.
Each of these issues has negatively impacted the progress
of digital forensics research.
Consider the file identification problem. Starting with
McDaniel’s (2001) master’s thesis, there have been slightly
more than a dozen papers that have concerned themselves
with the problem of identifying files using headers, footers, or
fragments taken from the middle. For example, Moody and
Erbacher (2008) report an accuracy rate of 72% for JPEG files;
they state that this is an improvement over the 43.83% that
McDaniel et al. report for the same problem. Karresand and
Shahmehri report 97.90% true positives and 99.99% true
negatives. Calhoun and Coles report accuracy rates ranging
from 83% to 99% (Calhoun and Coles, 2008). But none of these
results are comparable because none of them used the same
data sets! Worse, because the set used by each group is not
publicly available, anyone seeking to re-implement and
improve the algorithms is handicappeddthere is no way to
tell if the algorithm is properly implemented!
Another example is Deolalikar and Laffitte’s system for
combining file system metadata with content analysis to
automatically determine when source documents were edited
to create second-generation documents (Deolalikar and Latte,
2009). The documents used for the published paper were
proprietary documents from Hewlett Packard Labs. As
a result, the author’s paper and presentation had to be sani-
tizeddremoving critical information that would have allowed
better evaluation and analysisdand it is not possible for other
researchers to obtain the same corpus to see how other
reconstruction techniques compare to the experimenters’
published results.
2.4. Digital forensics education
The lack of readily available data sets has also been prob-
lematic for digital forensics education. Without standardized
data collections, educators are forced to spend significant
time creating their own data sets or to instruct students to get
their own data to by analyzing their own systems, the systems
of friends, by making purchases of used storage media on the
second hand market, or (in the case of network forensics) by
eavesdropping on open Wi-Fi access points.
1 This paper uses the term IRB to denote any formalized insti-
tutional oversight process.
2 Note that these researchers implicitly assume that
self-experimentation on their own human subject data does not
require IRB approval. However there is no exemption in the IRB
regulations for self-experimentation.
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After several years of teaching computer security and
digital forensics at the undergraduate and graduate level, we
have concluded that it is inappropriate to use real data such as
this in a classroom environment:
 Real data may contain information that is privacy-sensitive
and may even be legally protected, including personal
email, financial records, academic records, and stored
passwords. Using this data in the classroom environ-
mentdeven for homework assignmentsdcreates the
possibility that confidential information may be inappro-
priately disclosed.
 Although the real data itself may not be protected, it may be
illegal for students to obtain the real data.
 Real data may contain content that is itself illegal (e.g.
obscene images and child pornography) or that is illegal to
distribute to minors (e.g. pornography).
 Because personally owned computer systems contain
highly confidential data, a professor cannot ethically ask
students to share their data with one another. Even students
working in groups risk divulging to fellow group members
highly personal data (email messages, photos, passwords to
websites, and event graded assignments) to other group
members if they use their own hard drives for analysis.
 Students performing an analysis on their own computers
know in advance what they are going to finddthere is no
element of surprise. Additionally, a single student computer
lacks diversity. Thus, students who are limited to analyzing
their own systems suffer a compromised educational
experience.
 Because the data is generated by human beings, use of real
data in research is classified as human subjects research
under 45 CFR 46 (the ‘‘Common Rule’’) and requires approval
by an Institutional Review Board (Garfinkel, 2008). Such
approval typically takes weeks or months and cannot be
reasonably performed within the context of most under-
graduate courses.
These scenarios are not the result of idle speculation.
Garfinkel has purchased more than 2000 devices on the
secondary market. One of these devices contained 30,000
patient billing records from a medical facility in Florida.
Another hard drive was previously used in an ATM machine
and still had several thousand transactions on it. Several
devices purchased on the secondary market contained
pornography (Garfinkel and Shelat, 2002). Later, in a class that
Garfinkel taught at Harvard Extension School, students were
invited to create forensic reports of USB devices borrowed
from friends; in one case a device that was purchased as
‘‘new’’ contained photographs from a previous
userdapparently the ‘‘new’’ device had been previously sold,
used, returned, and re-sold. Fortunately the device did not
contain any illegal content.
It is theoretically impossible to review a hard drive in
advance and determine if that drive contains content that is
inappropriate or illegaldif it were possible to do this, Digital
Forensics would be a solved problem! Consider a USB storage
device purchased on the secondary market that contains
a single photograph. A professor examining the file might see
a flower. But a student examining the same photo might
discover that the file contains a hidden image that is protected
with steganography and cryptography. Upon performing
a keyword search the student discovers the passworddand
upon decrypting the embedded image, the student discovers
illegal content. There is simply no way that an educator can
protect students by pre-screening forensic data sets acquired
in the wild.
Undergraduates working on year-long research projects or
graduate studies have the time to be properly trained in the
handling of human subject data. It may be appropriate to give
these students access to controlled corpora of real data from
real users. But there is no reason why the average under-
graduate enrolled in an introductory or upper-level computer
forensics course needs to be working with data for which the
content is not known.
3. Corpora characterization
Our proposal is to establish curated, standardized corpora that
will be available for use in research, tool testing and
education.
3.1. Corpora modalities
We envision many different kinds of corpora:
Disk Images are the most fundamental kind of forensic
corpora because of their long-established use in the field of
forensics and because of their general usefulness.
Memory images are urgently needed for the development of
both forensic tools and forensic training. Ideally a memory
image corpus would include images from multiple versions of
multiple operating systems.
Network Packets have already been productively included in
corpora. Packet corpora can consist of traffic from one or more
individual systems or networks.
Files can be productively collected and distributed as corpora.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, there has been considerable work
on file and file fragment identification which would have
benefited from standardized corpora of files. Work on meta-
data and text extraction would also benefit from such corpora.
Although files can certainly be extracted from disk images,
distributing files as stand-alone corpora significantly
simplifies the effort for the intended users.
In many cases it is useful for a corpus to contain time
sequencesdfor example, a single disk that is repeatedly imaged
during the course of operations. It is also useful to have
a multi-modality corporadfor example, disk images and
matching network packets or memory images.
3.2. Corpora sensitivity
In addition to differing modalities of corpora, we believe that
there is a need for corpora containing both sensitive and non-
sensitive information. To this end we have developed the
following taxonomy:
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Test Data is specifically constructed for the purpose of
demonstrating a specific forensic issue or testing a specific
feature in a tool. An example of this is the Russian Tea Room
floppy disk image (Lyle, 2008b) in the NIST Computer Forensic
Reference Data Sets (Lyle, 2008a), which is used to validate
Unicode search and display capabilities. Test data should be
contain sufficient data to demonstrate or validate the specific
item being tested but be otherwise simple and uncluttered
with additional information. Test data can be freely distrib-
uted on the Internet without any controls.
Sampled data is obtained by selecting a subset of a large data
source, such as the Internet, using some kind of randomized
process. The essential idea is to eliminate bias that may come
from the use of a researchers own data collection (e.g. docu-
ments or images from the researcher’s personal hard drive).
However, if true random sampling technique is employed, it
becomes difficult to publish the set as it is impractical to
ascertain that none of the files have any legal restrictions on
redistribution.
Realistic data is similar to what a forensic investigator might
encounter in an investigation, but the data set was in fact
artificially constructed. Realistic data is typically created by
performing clean installations of software on wiped
machines. At this point the experimenter can run programs,
perform basic operations, or even engage in sophisticated role
play with other experimenters. Examples of Realistic data are
boomer-win2k (Kornblum, 2007), a memory image of
a Windows 2000 SP0 computer that is part of the Digital
Forensics Tool Testing Images (Carrier, 2007), and the DARPA
Intrusion Detection Data Sets (2000). Although there should be
no privacy concerns when distributing realistic data, there
may be copyright concerns.
Real and Restricted Data is created by actual human beings
during activities that were not performed for the purpose of
creating forensic test data. Access to this data should be
controlled: it should not be placed on the Internet for anony-
mous download. Real data is typically subject to restrictions
because of privacy or copyright concerns.
Real but Unrestricted data sets can be (or have been) made
available for unrestricted access. For example, the Enron
Email Dataset (Klimt and Yang, 2004) is a corpus of 619,446 real
email messages from the 158 users inside the Enron Corpo-
ration. These email messages were entered as evidence in
a court case by the US Government and, as a result, became
publicly available without restriction. Another example of real
but unrestricted data are photos that can be downloaded from
the Flickr photo sharing website and user profiles on
Facebook.
3.3. Restrictions on corpora use
Whether or not the distribution of a corpus is ‘‘restricted’’, the
use of the corpus may still be legally governed within an
organization as a result of the Common Rule. Although 45 CFR
46 specifically exempts ‘‘observation of public behavior’’ and
research of ‘‘existing data, documents [and] records’’, most
universities require that the determination of exemption be
made by the IRB, not by the individual experimenter. Addi-
tionally, the regulations do not allow exemption if the data
subjects can be identified. This is a problematic distinction, as
the identifiably of data subjects is not just a function of the
data in question, but also a function of additional databases
available to the researcher and the researcher’s technical skill.
3.4. Describing corpora with metadata
Currently there is no standardized metadata or schema to
describe forensic corpora or elements within a corpora. For
example, the HoneyNet Project has distributed 34 different
‘‘Scans’’ of disk images, memory images, packet traces, and
other information. Not only are each of the scans distributed
in different formatsdthere is not even a consistent schema
for talking about the Scans. Instead, each ‘‘scan of the month’’
has a web page, and even these pages lack consistency
(Honeynet, 2009).
One approach for characterizing corpora and corpora
objects is to use the schema developed by the Dublin Core
Metadata Initiative (2009). The Simple Dublin Core Metadata
Element Set (DCMES) is a set of 15 elements: Title, Creator,
Subject, Description, Publisher, Contributor, Date, Type,
Format, Identifier, Source, Language, Relation, Coverage and
Rights. Although many of these elements may not be appro-
priate to all forensic corpora, using DCMES for corpora seems
a reasonable alternative to having the forensic research
community develop its own, incompatible metadata frame-
work. For example, we note that the National Science Digital
Library specifies the use of Dublin Core for contributed data
sets (The National Science Digital Library, 2009).
4. Available corpora and data sets
This section describes a number of data sets that we have
developed and are making available for digital forensics
research. For each set we explain the motivation, the content,
and whatever restrictions are being imposed on the distribu-
tion and use.
4.1. A real but unrestricted file corpus
In recent years a significant amount of forensic research has
involved the analysis of files or file fragments. In the absence
of such corpora, researchers and students who wish to work
with files first need to collect filesda surprisingly difficult task
if one wishes a large number of files of many types from
a variety of sources. Although many files can be freely
downloaded from the web, building and running a high
performance document discovery and downloading tool is not
a trivial task. Once files are downloaded they need to be
analyzed, characterized and curated. Finally, many corpora
that might be assembled cannot be easily redistributed due to
privacy or copyright concerns.
For these reasons, we have created and released a corpus of
1 million documents that are freely available for research and
may be (to the best of our knowledge) freely redistributed.
These documents were obtained by performing searches for
words randomly chosen from the Unix dictionary, numbers
randomly chosen between 1 and 1 million, and randomized
combinations of the two, for documents of specified file types
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that resided on web servers in the .gov domain using the
Yahoo and Google search engines.
Each file in the corpus is presented as a numbered file with
the original file extension (e.g. 0000001.jpg). They are distrib-
uted as a set of 1000 directories, with 1000 files in each
directory.
We are making this corpus of 1 million documents avail-
able in several forms:
 As a set of files in an EXT2 file system delivered on a 1TB
SATA internal hard drive.
 As a set of 1000 ZIP files (1000 files in each ZIP file) that can be
downloaded from our web server.
 As a set of 10 subsets (‘‘thread 0’’ through ‘‘thread 9’’), each
containing 1000 randomly chosen documents. These
subsets were specifically created for to facilitate pilot
studies and student research projects with the rationale
that it’s easier to work with 1000 files than with 1 million.
Students are encouraged to use one subset for development
and another subset for testing.
 As a set of 1 million files that can each be downloaded from
our web server using a file-specific URL.
The following metadata is provided for each of the files:
 The URL from which the file was downloaded.
 The date and time of the download.
 The search term that was used.
 The search engine that provided the document.
 The length and SHA1 of the file.
 A Simple Dublin Core for the file. An example of such
a record appears in Fig. 1.
The metadata is distributed as a tab-delimited file and as
an SQL database dump. We have also created a Simple Dublin
Core record for the entire corpus.
The entire corpus can be downloaded from our web server,
http://domex.nps. edu/corp/files/govdocs1/.
4.2. Test disk images
We have created and have made available two test disk
images for computer forensic tool testing and education:
nps-2009-hfsjtest13 A test image of a journaled HFSþ system
in which the data from a previous version of one of the files
can only be recovered from the HFSþ journal. Although the
presence of this data can be verified on the disk using a hex
editor, no forensic tool that we are aware of can attribute the
data to the file from which it came.
nps-2009-ntfs1 A test image of an NTFS file system including
unfragmented and highly fragmented files stored in raw,
compressed, and encrypted directories. The decryption key
for the encrypted files is provided in the root directory of the
NTFS file system.
These images are available for download from our Test
Disk Corpora website, http://www.digitalcorpora.org/.
4.3. Realistic disk images
We have also created and have made available four realistic
disk images:
nps-2009-canon2 is a set of six FAT32 forensic images created
during a typical use of a Canon PowerShot SD800IS digital
camera. The images were made by placing an SD card into the
camera, taking photos, removing the card, erasing select
photos, imaging the card, and then repeating the process.
Some of the JPEGs are fragmented, some are not. Some are
resident in the file system, some are deleted but recoverable,
and several have data present but no longer have any file
system metadata and can only be recovered through carving.
Of these carvable JPEGs at least two are fragmented. This
image was created to test and teach basic file recovery, frag-
mented file recovery, and file carving.
nps-2009-ubnist1 is a set of images made from a USB memory
stick that contains a bootable copy of Ubuntu 8.10 Linux. Over
the course of several weeks the image was repeatedly booted
in Linux, used to browser several US Government websites,
and then shut down and imaged. This image contains a boot
loader and a FAT32 file system.
nps-2009-casper-rw The ext3 file systems extracted from the
nps-2009-ubnist1 USB images. Although these file systems
can be extracted from the FAT32 file systems by the user, it is
somewhat easier to have the EXT3 file system provided as
a separate disk image. (The word ‘‘casper’’ is the name of the
file on in the FAT32 system that houses this file).
nps-2009-domexusers This is an NTFS file system of
computer running Windows XP containing two user accounts.
Over a course of several days, an experimenter playing the
role of two users exchanged instant messages and emails with
a third user that resided on a separate system. The two
accounts received, edited and saved office document files as
well as various media files. Some of these files were then
deleted. Email and instant messenger conversations were
saved locally on the system. The accounts also visited web
pages for news and webmail. Details of the precise method by
which this disk image were prepared can be found in another
publication (Farrell, 2009). This image has been redacted with
a special redaction tool (Garfinkel, 2009a) that scrambles the
instructions from the Microsoft Windows executables but
leaves the strings untouched. This allows analysis of the DLLs
but prevents the image from being used to run Windows
without a license, which believe is sufficient redaction for the
purpose of distributing the disk image under the ‘‘fair use’’
provisions of the US Copyright Act.
These images are also available for download.
4.4. The real data corpus
The Real Data Corpus (RDC) is a collection of raw data
extracted from hard drives, flash memory cards, and other
data-carrying devices that were purchased on the secondary
market around the world (Table 1). Many studies have shown
that hard drives, cell phones, USB memory sticks, and other
data-carrying devices are frequently discarded by their orig-
inal users without the data first being cleared or purged. By3 The full name of the file system has been blinded for review.
d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 6 ( 2 0 0 9 ) S 2 – S 1 1 S7
purchasing these devices and extracting their data, we have
created a data set that has much of the diversity of drive data
that exists in the real world. For example, drives in the RDC
come from many operating systems, but they are predomi-
nantly from Windows-based computers. There is a wide range
of Windows variants, as well as a wide selection of application
programs that were used to create the data files. Many of the
programs are from off-the-shelf and shrinkwrapped applica-
tions, but there is also a large selection of custom applications.
Some of the disks contain default installations of Windows
and not much else; others are awash in personal information.
There are, nevertheless, important differences between
the RDC drive images and those in the real world. First, while
drives seized during the course of police investigations tend to
be working, a significant number of hard drives sold on the
secondary market are malfunctioning in some way-
dotherwise why would they have been sold? We thus see
much higher failure rates with drives in the RDC that those in
typical police work. As a result, many of the disk images are
incompletedmany have data at the front of the disk and at
the back of the disk, but are missing data in the middle where
presumably there was some kind of disk failure.
Some of the disks in the RDC contain all of the data that
was on the drive when it was taken out of service. On others
there was some attempt made at sanitizationdin some cases
files were deleted, in other cases the file system was
formatted. In some cases the entire file system was actually
erased or blanked. Rather than purge the data set of these
devices, we keep them as part of the set for external validity.
For example, having disks that have had various sanitization
attempts allows us to develop software that diagnoses the
manner in which sanitization was attempted.
4.4.1. RDC size: US vs. non-US
Because of restrictions imposed on some researchers within
the US Government, we make available two different versions
of the Real Data Corpus. The US Persons Real Data Corpus
contains images of disk drives purchased inside the United
States, while the Non-US Persons Real Data Corpus contains
data from devices that have been purchased outside the US.
The term ‘‘Real Data Corpus’’ (RDC) is used to describe the
union of the two corpora.
4.4.2. XML index
Each image file in the RDC is distributed with an XML file that
contains information about the disk from which the image file
was created, the partitions that were found on the disk, and all
of the files in the partition that can be recovered using
SleuthKit.
Fig. 2 shows the first 32 lines of the XML file generated from
disk image ubnist1.gen0.raw discussed earlier. All of the XML
is located inside an <fiwalk> block (fiwalk stands for ‘‘file and
inode walk). The XML starts with tags that describe which
version of fiwalk, Sleuthkit, and AFFLIB were used to create
the XML file; this allows new XML files to be automatically
generated by our system when the tools are upgraded. This
outer XML block can also contain information about the disk
itself, such as the serial number of the ATA disk from which
the image was made.
The <volume> block is repeated for each volume that is
discovered inside the disk image. Typically there is one
volume per file system. File system parameters such as the
block size, file system type, and size (in blocks) is reported.
Finally, a<fileobject> block is reported for each file that can
be recovered. The information in this block is the information
that is extracted by SleuthKit. The primary advantage of
having this information in XML description is that more
people know how to read XML than know how to either read
SleuthKit’s text output formats or who know how to link the
SleuthKit library in to their applications. Furthermore, unlike
SleuthKit, the information is designed for extreme usability:
this is why the<byte_runs> tags, which reports the location of
each fragment in the file, are reported from both the beginning
of the file system and the beginning of the physical disk image.
Using the information in the XML description it is possible
for another program to determine which files are present in
the disk image and to directly extract the contents of the files
without relying on additional programs such as SleuthKit,
EnCase or FTK. (Note: it is currently not possible to extract files


















Fig. 1 – The Simple Dublin Core record for File #000001 in the million file corpus.
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and SleuthKit does not currently support files that are
encrypted using Microsoft EFS).
The XML files make it dramatically easier to work with the
disk images, since it is easy to scan the XML to see if a file is
present or absent. The use of XML, in preference to SleuthKit’s
native vertical-bar delimited format, allows the XML-gener-
ating tools to be upgraded and the XML to be annotated
without modifying tools that ingest the XML.
We have also used the XML to support a remote access
methodology. We have made the XML files available on
a password-protected secure web server. These files can then
be downloaded by an intended consumer of the files. The
consumer can scan the files for files of a specific name or hash
code. The consumer can then issue an XMLRPC call to our
secure server and request specific blocks of a disk image.
Using this methodology one of our research partners has
searched the RDC for specific files and downloaded just the
XML metadata files and then the specific files within the disk
images that were of interest.
4.4.3. RDC uses
To date the RDC has been used for a number of projects,
including:
1 Developing and validating forensic and data recovery
tools. (Numerous bugs in The SleuthKit have been
discovered by processing all of the RDC disk images with
SleuthKit.)
2 Exploring and characterizing real-world computing prac-
tices, configuration choices, and option settings.
3 Studying the storage allocation strategies of file systems
under real-world conditions.
4 Developing novel computer forensic algorithms.
4.4.4. Access, availability and restrictions
The RDC is available to qualified research collaborators as
a set of encrypted AFF files. Encryption is with AES 256 and can
be based on either a pass phrase or X.509 PKI using AFF
encryption (Garfinkel, 2009b). The corpus can be obtained
through a variety of modalities, including:
1 Disk images can be downloaded over the Internet from
a secure server using SSL by authorized researchers.
2 Individual files from the corpus can be copied onto a 3.5’’
SATA hard drive (Mac HFS or EXT2 format).
3 Researchers can be given an account on a multi-user Linux
computer on which all of the corpora resides.
4 The remote access methodology can be used to access
individual files in the corpus.
Because the information in RDC comes from real people,
we require that all intended users obtain approval from their
IRBs and provide us with a copy of both the IRB application
and the approval letter.4
5. Lessons learned
This project ended up being much harder than we original
suspected.
The first and most difficult aspect of this project has been
working with the large size of forensic files. Although these
days a 1TB hard drive can be purchased for less than $100, it is
still quite difficult to work with a large number of disk files in
the 10–100 GB range. Simply moving the files from system to
system was a slow and tedious process, compounded by slow
data transfer rates, failing hard drives, minor data corruption
issues, and constantly running out of space on target devices.
It would be very nice to have a high-availability persistent file
store which offered a globally addressable name space and












































Fig. 2 – The first few lines in XML file created from
ubnist1.gen0.raw; lines have been indented for clarity.
4 Strangely, one potential collaborator was told by the legal
department at his university that he could not share his IRB
application with us because it was ‘‘university property’’. Because
the approval letter simply said that the protocol had been
approved without explaining the protocol that had been
approved, we were unable to work with the collaborator.
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We have adopted the following strategy for working with
disk images which seems to work quite well:
 Whenever possible, a single disk image should be stored in
a single file.
 We have one master server which has the master copy of
each disk image.
 No two disk images should have the same file name, even if
they are in different directories.
 When files are moved from system to system, the path
names should not change. This allows the same scripts to be
run on every system without change.
 Instead of using the rm command, we wrote a Python script
that only erases a file if there is already a copy of the file on
the master server.
In working on the million document corpus, we were
frustrated by the decision of the .gov administrator to open
the domain up to US States and Local governments, but then
to refuse our requests for a list of non-federal domains that
had been admitted. As a result, we were forced to manually
reviewed all of the domains and removed documents from
non-federal web servers. Of course, due to the size of the
corpus, it was not possible to manually review each
document.
We were also frustrated by web servers which claimed to
be offering files up using one MIME type but actually delivered
a document that was coded in another. We discovered that we
needed to scan for duplicates at all stages of processingdfor
example, suppressing duplicate URLs, but also computing the
SHA1 of each document and dropping it from the database if
another document with the same SHA1 was already present.
(Typically, this happened because web servers were config-
ured to give HTML error pages served without a 403 error
codes).
Finally, we were frustrated by the Yahoo search API, which
uses a different API for searching for documents than for
images, and by the inability of Yahoo’s API to search for
arbitrary document types.
6. Related work
With substantial funding from the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, MIT Lincoln Labs created a test
network that simulated a US Air Force Base and the external
Internet. Several hundred megabytes of packets (compressed)
were captured representing both normal traffic and attacks.
The results were used as the basis of the DARPA 1998, 1999
and 2000 Intrusion Detection Evaluation programs (Cunning-
ham et al., 1999).
The MAWI Working Group of the WIDE Project has created
a Traffic Archive with many packet traces of the trans-Pacific
data links (Mawi working group traffic archive, 2009). This
archive is of limited use since the IP traces are ‘‘scrambled by
a modified version of tcpdpriv’’. The data payloads have also
been removed. Nevertheless the authors warn that ‘‘actions
that trespass upon users’ privacy are prohibited’’. One of the
most useful corpora to have been released to the forensics
community is the Enron Corpus (Klimt and Yang, 2004). This
data set is useful because of its depth and because, unlike
other corpora, it is largely unredacted. A list of more than 20
different corpora that can be of use in forensics research,
including the corpora from the Text REtrieval Conference, the
American National Corpus Project, and the CALLFRIEND
database of voice recordings, can be found on the Forensics
Wiki at http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Forensic_corpora.
Other research communities have established corpora for
the purpose of enabling research; indeed, the creation of
corpora has come to be regarded as a worthy scientific pursuit
in its own right. For example, GenBank is a database of genetic
sequences operated by the National Institutes of Health
(National Center for Biotechnology Information, 2008).
Some schools have attempted to address the problem of
exposing information security students to sensitive informa-
tion by requiring that they sign written agreements. For
example, George Washington University requires that
students ‘‘students entering Certificate, Masters or Doctoral
programs in information assurance management’’ to sign an
agreement stating that they will comply with the school’s
Code of Conduct, a draconian document that threatens
expulsion from the program for any infraction of the ethical or
legal rules (Rayan and Rayan).
7. Conclusion
In this work, we argued that the development of represen-
tative standardized corpora for digital forensics research is
essential for the long-term scientific health and legal
standing of the field. We developed a baseline taxonomy of
such corpora and outlined the legal and ethical hurdles that
complicate their development. And we present a number of
data sets that attempt to cover the spectrum of scenarios and
have made them openly available to researchers. Special care
has been taken to document the source of the data, as well as
to avoid as many legal restrictions on its distribution as
possible.
It is our hope that the community will support this effort
and will adopt the provided sets for education, testing and
research. Over the long run, it will be important to extend the
scope of the corpora and to update it frequently to keep up
with the pace of technology development. To that end, feed-
back from researchers will be essential in improving the
collection methodology. We also hope that the sheer volume
of data will challenge tool developers to come up with new
techniques for processing huge amounts of data. In that case,
the corpora can serve a target for performance evaluation
studies.
The corpora we are presenting here are limited to corpora
of files and disk images. There is also a real and pressing need
for corpora of network packet captures and memory images.
We hope that our work here will serve as an inspiration to
others. We are happy to host the data from other experi-
menters on our web servers, so that there is ‘‘one-stop shop-
ping’’ for forensic students and researchers.
Recently the National Research Council issued a scathing
reporting on the status of forensic science, research, and
practice in the United States. The NRC report devotes little
space to the computer forensics, noting that much of today’s
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forensic practice originated in police departments, not
forensic laboratories, and stating that only 25% of the forensic
laboratories in the US have any computer forensics capability
at all. Nevertheless, the report’s concerns apply equally well to
digital forensics: ‘‘substantive information and testimony
based on faulty forensic science analysis may have contrib-
uted to wrongful convictions of innocent people. Moreover,
imprecise or exaggerated expert testimony has sometimes
contributed to the admission of erroneous or misleading
evidence (Committee, 2009)’’.
If digital forensic science is truly a science, then the
research community needs to adopt a culture of rigor and
insistence on the reproducibility of results. Standardized
forensic corpora will go a long way to making such desires
a reality.
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